Abstract To investigate the imitation dynamics of vaccine uptake, age-structured model is introduced, based on a model proposed by Bauch. The model is derived under the assumption that the potential infection risk depends on the infection age. The existence and local stability of equilibria are analyzed. A Hopf bifurcation may occur from the endemic and vaccinator equilibrium. Our study shows that imitation behavior is one factor that destabilizes the system and brings about oscillations in the case when non-vaccinators imitate vaccinators more readily. Infection-age is another factor that produces limit cycles if the latency period is long enough. The results show how the prevalence of the infection changes with respect to the infection age.
Introduction
Infectious diseases are one of the main enemies threatening human's health. Every year millions of people die as a result of various infectious diseases. Mathematical modeling plays an important role in studying and discovering the transmission mechanisms of important diseases. Ample theoretical work exists that investigates infectious diseases and obtains very valuable results for the control of epidemic spread. In some of the studies [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] on childhood diseases, one eminent feature is that the transmission rates have salient differences since children have different immunities.
Vaccination has been widely considered as one of the effective methods to reducing the morbidity and mortality from infectious diseases. There are two key vaccination policies: voluntary vaccination and mandatory vaccination. There has been a vigorous debate about voluntary vaccination policy failing to protect population adequately. A rational vaccine decision-making is determined by various factors, such as perceived infection risk, potential side effects from vaccination, and vaccinating behaviors of other individuals. Because of the declining familiarity with the interplay between perceived infection risk and potential side effects from vaccination, parents have various reasons for avoiding the potential side effects for their children, instead relying on enough other children being vaccinated to provide herd immunity. Therefore, rational decision may lead to a reduced number of vaccine intakes. This is a free-riding dilemma between individuals and the public good. Game theory builds a bridge connecting the epidemic models with individual behaviors.
Vaccine decision-making based on game theory has been extensively investigated (see, for example, [7] - [23] ). In these articles, it is usually assumed that individuals have full information for perceived infection risk and potential vaccine health risk. Under this assumption, rational vaccine decisionmaking will get the highest personal utilities, i.e., there exists a Nash equilibrium where no individuals could be better off by unilaterally changing to a different strategy [8, 9] . In [10] , Xia and Liu employed a computational approach to characterize the impact of social influence on individuals' vaccination decision-making while in [11] they also investigated the impact of the two factors, information of the disease prevalence and the perceived vaccination risk, and fading coefficient of awareness spread.
Recently, Xu and Cresmman [12] built a nonlinear epidemic model with the smoothed best response by game-theory based decisions on vaccination. Their results showed that if there is a perceived cost for vaccination, the smoothed best response is very effective in controlling the disease spread, but if vaccination is free, the best response is a good control. Zhang et al. [13] investigated the "double-edged sword" effect on public health conditions for rational decision-making. Shim et al used game dynamic models to gain insight into the decision-making between vaccine skeptics and vaccine believers [36] and the decision making with regard to antiviral intervention during an influenza pandemic [37] , respectively.
The above-mentioned references focus on vaccine uptake based on the perfect information the parents mastered on perceived infection risk and potential vaccine side effects. In fact, the vaccine uptake behaviors evolve with respect to time. Individuals' decision on vaccination or non-vaccination is conducted by imitating others who appear to have adopted more successful strategies. The process is called "imitation dynamics" and it has been studied by some researchers. Bauch [14] investigated parents' vaccinating decisions for their children with the assumption that the susceptibles behave strategically in accordance with imitation dynamics and studied the dependence of epidemic prevalence and coverage of vaccination on these strategic decisions. Fu et al. [15] proposed an agent based model on social network with game theory to shed light on how imitation of peers shapes individual vaccination choices. d'Onofrio et al. [16] assumed that the perceived risk of vaccination is a function of the incidence and studied an SIR transmission model with dynamic vaccine demand based on an imitation mechanism. A common assumption in these existing vaccination models on imitation dynamics is that individuals are homogeneously mixed or heterogeneously mixed on social networks [17, 18, 38] . This can not capture the feature of different transmission rates for childhood diseases which we mentioned earlier. In order to address the imitation behaviors on vaccination decisionmaking, we develop an age-structured epidemic model based on the game theory. We assume that the transmission incidence rate varies according to the infection age and individuals act their behaviors with imperfect information about perceived infection risk and potential vaccine side effects. The payoff of the perceived infection risk is also dependent on the infection age. Parents imitate the vaccination decision-making of their neighbors and then adopt the vaccine policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Based on the game theory, an SIR epidemic model with infection age is introduced in Section 2. We study the existence of equilibria and their local stability in Section 3. A local Hopf bifurcation may occur. Section 4 is devoted to the global stability of boundary equilibria based on the fluctuation lemma and the results for the case without vaccination.
We also consider the persistence of the disease in Section 4. In Section 5, numerical simulations are provided to demonstrate the theoretical results. The paper concludes with discussion.
The model formulation
Chris T Bauch in [14] proposed an epidemic model to predict vaccinating behavior based on game theory. He divided the total population into three classes: the Susceptible S(t), the Recovered R(t), and the Infected I(t) at time t. He assumed that all newborns are susceptible; all the groups decrease due to natural death; susceptible individuals are infected by infectious individuals and enter the infected group; infectious individuals exit the group due to natural death and recovery; recovered group increases due to recovered infectious individuals and the vaccinated newborns and decreases due to natural death; recovered individuals acquire permanent immunity from the disease or vaccination and never leave this group. The incidence rate used is in bilinear form. In order to understand a strategic interaction between individuals when they are deciding whether or not to vaccinate, he introduced a replicator equation for an evolution population game, and the payoff function varied according to time. In the replicator equation a proportion x of the children are vaccinated at birth.
The equation formally reads as
where the vaccination cost is −r v , non-vaccination cost is r i mI. r i denotes the perceived probability of suffering significant morbidity upon infection, m qualifies the sensitivity of vaccinating behavior to changes in prevalence, k denote the imitation rate. He proposed an epidemic model based on game theory given by the following equations.
where Λ is the input rate, β is the transmission rate, µ is the natural death rate, γ is recovered rate.
The incubation period of some childhood disease varies, for measles ranging from 7 to 21 days [33] , for mumps ranging from 16 to 25 days[34], for pertussis ranging from 4 to 21 days [35] . It is easy to note that different diseases have different latency period. We introduce the infection age to describe this feature as well as the variability of infectivity shown by infectious individuals in many diseases.
Therefore, we assume that the incidence rate depends on the infectious age a in the following way,
where β(a) is the transmission rate with infection age a.
For convenience, the perceived vaccination cost is −r; while the potential risk cost for nonvaccinator mainly depends on the epidemic transmission, so its cost is − ∞ 0 β(a)i(t, a)da, or the payoff benefit is ∞ 0 β(a)i(t, a)da. The payoff gain for vaccinator compared non-vaccinator is ∞ 0 β(a)i(t, a)da− r. This is formally familiar with [12] . Then the derivation of x is described as a replicator equation
Based on the above assumptions, the model with game theory is given by the following system of ordinary and partial differential equations,
with the boundary condition
and initial conditions
where L 1 + is the set of all integrable functions from R + = [0, ∞) into R + . γ(a) is the age-dependent recovery rate with infection age a, δ is the imitation rate which has the familiar biological meaning with k in (2.1).
Due to the biological meaning, Λ, µ, δ and r are all positive, and β = 0 and k belong to C BU (R + , R + ) with β being not identically zero, where C BU (R + , R + ) denotes the set of all bounded and uniformly continuous functions from R + into R + .
Note that the third equation of (2.2) is decoupled from the others. Then we can ignore it and only consider the following system,
Due to [24, 25] , if i 0 satisfies the coupling equation
In what follows, whenever we refer to the solution of (2.3), the above assumptions on the boundary and initial conditions are satisfied.
Proposition 2.1. Let (S(t), i(t, a), x(t)) be a solution of (2.3) with the maximal interval of existence [0, ρ) (ρ is allowed to be ∞). Then S(t) ≥ 0, i(t, a) ≥ 0, and x(t) ∈ [0, 1] for t ∈ [0, ρ) and a ∈ R + .
Proof. Firstly, from the third equation of (2.3), we have
Secondly, by the first equation of (2.3), we see that
Now, for any ξ ∈ [0, ρ), we claim that i(t, a) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, ξ] and a ∈ R + (the idea of the proof is borrowed from Browne and Pilyugin [26] ). By way of contradiction, assume that there exists t 0 ∈ [0, ξ] and a 0 ∈ R + such that i(t 0 , a 0 ) < 0. Integrating the second equation of (2.3) with the boundary condition yields that, for t ∈ [0, ξ] and a ∈ R + , we have 5) where
. By the continuity of B(t) and the definition of t * , we know that B(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, t * ) and B(t * ) = 0.
Note that, with the help of (2.5),
Since B is continuous on [0, ξ] and B(t * ) = 0, there exists an
Then Y is a complete distance space with the supremum distance and S is a closed subset of Y . Define L on S by
Obviously, L(S) ⊂ Y . Note that Lϕ| [0,t * ] = B| [0,t * ] for ϕ ∈ S and LB = B. Then, for ϕ ∈ S and t ∈ [t * , t * + ε], we have
and this shows that L is a mapping from S into itself. Moreover, for ϕ 1 , ϕ ∈ S, we have
that is, L is a contraction mapping on S. By the Banach Fixed Point Theorem, there exists a uniquê
. By the uniqueness of solutions, we have B(t) =φ(t) for t ∈ [0, t * + ε]. This contradicts with the definition of t * and hence we have proved the claim. Since ξ is arbitrary, we see that i(t, a) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, ρ) and a ∈ R + . This completes the proof.
With the help of Proposition 2.1, we can obtain
for t ∈ [0, ρ), which implies that lim sup t→ρ − N (t) < ∞. Therefore, the maximal interval of existence for every solution of (2.3) is R + . Let Φ :
Note that, by (2.6), lim sup
Then we have proved the following result.
Proposition 2.2. Γ is an attractive and positively invariant set for (2.3).
To end this section, we mention that, by (2.4), both sets {(S, i, x) ∈ Γ : x = 0} and {(S, i, x) ∈ Γ : x = 1} are also positively invariant subsets of (2.3). It is clear that for solutions in {(S, i, x) ∈ Γ :
3) reduces to the case without vaccination, that is,
This model has been studied by Magal et al. [27] and their main results are as follows.
Theorem 2.3 ([27, Theorem 1.2 and Theorem 1.3]). (i) If
is globally asymptotically stable for the semiflow generated by (2.7).
(ii) Letā
Then every solution of (2.7) with the initial value in ∂M 0 (respectively in M 0 ) stays in ∂M 0 (respectively in M 0 ). Moreover, each solution with initial value in
. Furthermore, every solution with an initial value in M 0 converges to the endemic equilibrium (
)π(a)), which is locally asymptotically stable.
The attractivity of the endemic equilibrium in Theorem 2.3(ii) is established by the approach of Lyapunov functionals. We also mention that Theorem 2.3 will play an important role in dealing with the attractivity of the boundary equilibria of (2.3).
Existence of equilibria and their local stability
Recall that π(a) = e In fact, R 0 is called the basic reproduction number and it denotes the average number of cases that one typical infected individual can produce during the infectious period. As we will see soon, the structure of equilibria of (2.3) depends on the values of R 0 .
By direct computation, we easily see that (3.1) has four equilibria,
, where
The existence of equilibria of (2.3) is summarized below.
3) has two equilibria E 1 and E 2 .
(
3) has three equilibria E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 .
3) has four equilibria E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , and E 4 .
From the biological perspective, E 1 is the disease-free and pure vaccinator strategy equilibrium, E 2 is the disease-free and non-vaccinator strategy equilibrium, E 3 is the endemic and non-vaccinator strategy equilibrium, and E 4 is the endemic and vaccinator strategy equilibrium. LetĒ * = (S * ,ī * ,x * ) be an equilibrium of (2.3). Then the linearized system atĒ * is
Letting S(t) = s 0 e λt , i(t, a) = y(a)e λt , and x(t) = x 0 e λt leads to the characteristic equation atĒ * , which is
, whereK(λ) = ∞ 0 β(a)π(a)e −λa da. Then we can get the local stability of E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 as follows.
Theorem 3.2. (i)
The disease free and pure vaccinator equilibrium E 1 is always unstable.
(ii) The disease free and non-vaccinator equilibrium E 2 is locally asymptotically stable if R 0 < 1 and it is unstable if R 0 > 1.
(iii) The endemic and non-vaccinator equilibrium E 3 is locally asymptotically stable if
and it is unstable if
which has a positive root δr. This implies that E 1 is unstable.
(ii) The characteristic equation at E 2 is
Besides the two negative roots −µ and −δr, the other roots are given by the equation
we claim that all roots of (3.2) have negative real parts. Otherwise, if λ 0 is a root of (3.2) with nonnegative real part, then
a contradiction. This proves the claim. Therefore, E 2 is stable if R 0 < 1 and it is unstable if R 0 > 1.
First, the root of λ−δi *
K has no root with nonnegative real part. By contradiction, suppose it has a root λ 1 with nonnegative real part. Then
It follows that
which is a contradiction since
and Re(λ 1 ) ≥ 0 and R 0 > 1. This proves the claim. To summarize, we have proved (iii). The analysis for the stability of E 4 is not so easy. In fact, the characteristic equation at E 4 is
where C = Λrδx
It follows easily that (3.3) has no nonnegative real roots. However, it is hard to see whether (3.3) has roots with nonnegative real part or not. Actually, it may have roots with nonnegative real parts as we will see soon.
In order to have a clear picture of the dynamics of (2.3), we make the following further assumption.
Assumption 3.1. Assume that the transmission rate and the transfer rate are
Assumption 3.1 means that when the infection age is larger than τ the infected is also infectious and the infectivity is the same for all such infected individuals. We call τ the latent period. Assumption 3.1 also implies that the self-healing only occurs when the infected become infectious. If we add a constant recovery rate for infection age a ∈ [0, τ ) then the analysis is reasonably simple and we can still gain further insight into the dynamics. However, if we assume that the recovery rates differ at an infection age other than the latent period τ then the analysis will be very complicated. In the following we condition that the total number of non-vaccinators imitating vaccinators should be small enough.
Next, we consider the possibility of the stability switching for system (2.3). Note that (3.4) is a special case of the transcendental equation considered by Beretta and Kuang [28] , where they provided practical guidelines that combine graphical information with analytical work to effectively study local stability. The theory was also illustrated by them with first order and second order characteristic equations. Here is an application to a third order characteristic equation. Let
Then one can easily verify assumptions (i)-(iv) in Beretta and Kaung [28, p. 1145] . Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, a stability change at E 4 can only happen when there are eigenvalues crossing the imaginary axis from left to right. Therefore, we seek a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues λ = ±iw with w > 0 for some 0 < τ < τ min since 0 is not an eigenvalue. Substituting λ = iw into (3.4) (we only need to consider one of the roots) and separating the real and imaginary parts yields
We square both sides of the equations in (3.5) and add them up to obtain
with z = w 2 . According to Descartes' Rule of Signs, equation (3.7) has at most a positive root. On the other hand, it is easy to see that (3.7) has a positive root. Therefore, equation (3.7) has a unique positive root, denoted by w 2 0 (τ ) with w 0 (τ ) > 0. As w 2 0 (τ ) is a simple root of (3.7), we have
(obtained by substituting w 0 (τ ) into the right hand sides of (3.6)). For any n ∈ N 0 = {0, 1, 2 . . .},
The following result is deduced from Theorem 2.2 of Beretta and Kuang [28] .
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that there exist n 0 ∈ N 0 and τ * ∈ (0, τ min ) such that S n0 (τ * ) = 0.
Then (3.4) has a pair of simple conjugate pure imaginary roots λ ± (τ
Moreover, the pair of simple conjugate imaginary roots crosses the imaginary axis from left to right if s n0 (τ * ) > 0 and crosses the imaginary axis from right to left if s n0 (τ * ) < 0, where
dτ .
Denote S = {τ ∈ (0, τ min ) : S n(τ ) (τ ) = 0 for some n(τ ) ∈ N 0 }.
The set S is finite though it is a little bit long and difficult to show here. If S = ∅, let S = {τ 0 , τ 1 , . . . , τ n0 } for some n 0 ∈ N 0 with τ 0 < τ 1 < · · · < τ n0 . It is easy to deduce s n(τ0) (τ 0 ) ≥ 0 as (2.3) is stable when τ is small enough. The following result follows from Proposition 3.3 and the above discussion. (ii) If S = {τ 0 , τ 1 , . . . , τ n0 } with τ 0 < τ 1 < · · · < τ n0 then the endemic and vaccinator equilibrium 
The attractivity of boundary equilibria and disease persistence
In this section, we first study the attractivity of the boundary equilibria E 2 and E 3 by applying Theorem 2.3 and the comparison principle.
To establish the attractivity of E 2 , we need the fluctuation lemma. For a function ϕ : R + → R, we denote
Lemma 4.1 (Fluctuation Lemma [29] ). Let ϕ : R + → R be a bounded and continuously differentiable function. Then there exist sequences {s n } and {t n } such that s n → ∞,
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that R 0 ≤ 1. Then the equilibrium E 2 attracts all solutions of (2.3) with
Proof. Let (S(t), i(t, a), x(t)) be any solution of (2.3) with initial condition and boundary conditions from {(S, i, x) ∈ Γ : x ∈ [0, 1)}. Then x(t) ∈ [0, 1) for t ∈ R + and hence (S(t), i(t, x)) satisfies
Let (S(t),ī(t, a)) be the solution of the auxiliary system
with (S 0 ,ī 0 ) = (S 0 , i 0 ) andī(t, 0) =S(t) ∞ 0 β(a)ī(t, a)da. With the help of the comparison principle, it is easy to see that 0 ≤ S(t) ≤S(t) and i(t, a) ≤ī(t, a) for (t, a) ∈ R 2 + . Since R 0 ≤ 1, it follows from Theorem 2.3 that (S(t),ī(t, a)) converges to ( 
Recalling that x(t) ∈ [0, 1) for t ∈ R + and ε < r, we easily see that lim t→∞ x(t) = 0.
Finally, we show lim t→∞ S(t) = Λ µ . By Lemma 4.1, choose {s n } such that s n → ∞, S(s n ) → S ∞ , and
µ . To summarize, we have shown that (S(t), i(t, a), x(a)) converges to E 2 . This completes the proof. 
Proof. Let (S(t), i(t, a), x(t)) be a solution of (2.3) with (S 0 , i 0 , x 0 ) ∈ Γ 0 .
We first show lim t→∞ x(t) = 0. From the proof of Theorem 4.2, we know that
for (t, a) ∈ R 2 + . Since R 0 > 1, it follows from Theorem 2.3 that Choose ε > 0 such that µ(R 0 − 1) + ε < r, which is possible since R 0 < 1 + r µ . So there exists t 0 ∈ R + such that
By the third equation of (2.3), we have
This, together with µ(R 0 − 1) + ε − r < 0 and x(t) ∈ [0, 1) for t ∈ R + , gives lim t→∞ x(t) = 0.
Next, we show that S(t) → S * and i(t, ·) → i *
), it follows from lim t→∞ x(t) = 0 that there exists t 1 ∈ R + such that 0 ≤ x(t) ≤ η for t ≥ t 1 .
Then, for t ≥ t 1 , (S(t), i(t, a)) satisfies
Let (Ŝ(t),î(t, a)) be the solution of the auxiliary system
Then applying the comparison principle yields 0 ≤Ŝ(t) ≤ S(t + t 1 ) and 0 ≤î(t, a) ≤ i(t + t 1 , a) (4.4)
for (t, a) ∈ R 2 + . Since (1 − η)R 0 > 1, applying Theorem 2.3 again, we see that
By (4.2)-(4.5), we have
By the arbitrariness of η, we have lim sup t→∞ ∞ 0 |i(t, a) − i * 1 (0)π(a)|da = 0. Therefore, we have proved that S(t) → S * and i(t, ·) → i *
This completes the proof.
Finally, we study the disease persistence of (2.3). Define ρ :
is the same as
there exists a t ∈ R + such that ρ(Φ(t, (S 0 , i 0 , x 0 )) > 0 and x ∈ [0, 1)}.
We distinguish two kinds of persistence.
• The disease in (2.3) is uniformly weakly ρ-persistent if there exists an η > 0, independent of the initial conditions, such that if
• The disease in (2.3) is uniformly strongly ρ-persistent if there exists an η > 0, independent of the initial conditions, such that if
3) is uniformly weakly ρ-persistent.
Proof. Since R 0 > 1 + r µ , there exists an ǫ such that 0 < ǫ < min(1, r) and
By way of contradiction, we assume that there exists
Then there is a t 1 ∈ R + such that
As before, it follows from x(t) ∈ [0, 1) for t ∈ R + , ǫ < r, and
As a result, we have
Then there exists t 3 ≥ t 2 such that
With the help of (2.5), we easily see that
By replacing the initial condition with (S(t 3 ), i(t 3 , ·), x(t 3 )), we can assume that (4.7) holds for all t ∈ R + . Note that both B(·) and β(·)π(·) are bounded functions on R + and hence their Laplace transforms exist at least on (0, ∞). It follows from (4.7) (with t 3 = 0) that
where ∧ · denotes the Laplace transform of a function. As B(·) is not identically zero on R + , we know thatB(λ) > 0 for λ ∈ (0, ∞). It follows from (4.8) that ( Lemma 3.2.3] ). For each t ∈ R + , suppose T (t) = S(t) + U (t) : X → X has the property that U (t) is complete continuous and there is a continuous function k : R + × R + → R + such that k(t, r) → 0 as t → ∞ and |S(t)x| ≤ k(t, r) if |x| < r. Then T (t), t ∈ R + , is asymptotically smooth.
The next result will be need in the discussion of Φ being asymptotically smooth.
Lemma 4.7. For any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that
Proof. It is easy to see that B(t) ≤β( Λ µ ) 2 for t ∈ R + . Now, let t ∈ R + and h > 0. Then
We now come to estimate
Note that, by (2.5), we have
Therefore,
Since −kh ≤ − a+h a k(s)da ≤ 0 and e −x ≥ 1 − x for x ∈ R + , we can get
This, together with (4.10) and the fact that β is uniformly continuous, immediately produces (4.9).
By Lemma 4.4, we know that Φ(t, D 0 ) ⊆ D 0 for t ∈ R + . So it induces a semiflow on D 0 . For t ∈ R + and (S 0 , i 0 , x 0 ) ∈ D 0 , let
for t < a.
(4.12)
Then Φ =Φ +Φ. Clearly, bothî andĩ are nonnegative. It follows from (4.12) that
and henceΦ satisfies the assumption in Lemma 4.6. Now, we show thatΦ is completely continuous, that is, the set {Φ(t, (S 0 , i 0 , x 0 )) : (S 0 , i 0 , x 0 ) ∈ B} is precompact for any fixed t ∈ R + and any bounded set B ⊆ D 0 . This is done by applying the Fréchet-Kolmogorov Theorem [31] . First, it follows easily from the definitions ofΦ, D 0 , and Γ that {Φ(t, (S 0 , i 0 , x 0 )) : (S 0 , i 0 , x 0 ) ∈ B} is bounded and this verifies the first condition of the Fréchet-Kolmogrov Theorem. Second, by (4.11), the third condition of Fréchet-Kolmogorov Theorem is satisfied. Finally, we verify the second condition of the Fréchet-Kolmogrov Theorem. It suffices to
show that
If t = 0 then (4.13) holds automatically sinceĩ(0, ·) = 0 by (4.11). Without loss of generality, we assume that t > 0. Since we concern with the limit as h tends to 0 + , we only consider h ∈ (0, t). Then
as we know B(t) ≤β( 
Numerical simulations
In this section, we always assume that Assumption 3.1 holds. We provide some simulations to illustrate the theoretical results obtained in the previous sections. Here I(t) = Suppose the cost for the vaccination is too small and let r = 0.000001. From the third equation of (2.3) we know that x monotonously increases to 1. Then (2.3) has a pure vaccinator equilibrium E 1 , which is unstable by Theorem 3.2 (see Figure 3(a) ). If the cost of the vaccination is free or low, then the coverage of the proportion vaccinated is towards high values. However, persons have no incentives to vaccinate and the pure vaccinator equilibrium is unstable.
We rise the cost for vaccination to r = 0.01 (which is between 0.000001 (lower cost) and 1.2 (higher cost)) and keep the other parameters unchanged as in the second case. Note that δ = 0.5 < 1 < βΛ βΛ−(µ+γ)(µ+r) . Theorem 3.2 implies that the endemic and vaccinator equilibrium E 4 is locally asymptotically stable, which is supported in Figure 3 and γ = 0.1. For some larger imitation rate δ, system (2.3) exhibits limit cycles and hence it can be destabilized by the imitation rate δ. Fig. 4(a) shows the bifurcation diagram by taking δ as a The perceived vaccine risk r impacts the prevalence of the disease spread. If the cost of the vaccination is high, such as a vaccine scare or a strong side effect, the frequency of the vaccination will gradually decrease and the prevalence of the disease will increase. Fig. 5(a) shows the infection equilibrium structure of (2.3) in terms of the disease prevalence vs r with Λ = 0.4, δ = 0.5, τ = 1.25,
, and γ = 0.1. We can see that the disease prevalence increases when the cost of vaccination increases. Moreover, the equilibrium E 4 changes stability with r in the interval [0, 0.2] at r = 0.01 from stable to unstable.
The latent period τ is also a key parameter for controlling the disease. For a childhood disease, if some medicine can extend the latent period of the disease, the prevalence of the disease can be lowered. Figure 5 (b) shows that τ can destabilize (2.3) and oscillations occur when τ is from 100 to 500. Here r = 0.01 and the other parameters except τ have the same values as above for the impact of r. Also, the prevalence of the disease gradually increases with respect to τ .
Discussion
From the theoretical analysis in the above sections, the pure vaccinator equilibrium E 1 is always unstable. Parents have no incentive to vaccinate if the vaccination coverage is high. The disease-free and non-vaccinator equilibrium E 2 is globally asymptotically stable if and only if R 0 < 1. If 1 < R 0 , then there is an endemic and non-vaccinator equilibrium E 3 , which is locally asymptotically stable if 1 < R 0 < 1 + µ r . The endemic and vaccinator equilibrium E 4 is locally asymptotically stable if R 0 > 1 + µ r , δ < Λβ βΛ−(µ+γ)(µ+r) and S = ∅. If S = {τ 0 , . . . , τ n0 } with s n(τ0) (τ 0 ) > 0, then a Hopf bifurcation occurs from the equilibrium E 4 , which implies that (2.3) can be destabilized.
The imitation rate δ is the main parameter that leads to destabilization of the system and to a Hopf bifurcation, which is proved in [14, 16] . The amplitude of the oscillations increases with the increase of the imitated behaviors. Rational decision-making individuals, depending on updated information about the perceived vaccine risk compared with the prevalence of the disease, decide whether or not to vaccinate their children. As mentioned earlier in Section 5, individuals imitate others more readily as the amount of information for the significant side effects of vaccination increases, which in turn enhances the difficulties in disease control. The difference in immunity, characteristic for childhood diseases, is incorporated through β(a), the different transmission ability for the different values of the infection age a. For special cases, different transmissibility can be described by the parameters τ and β. Suitable higher value of τ will produce a limit cycle.
When there is no cost for vaccination, i.e., r = 0, the payoff benefit is larger than the cost of vaccination as long as In summary, parents can make rational decisions in favor of disease control if they understand the interplay between the perceived vaccination risk, prevalence of the disease, and the variable transmission abilities of the children. Our investigation implies that high vaccination coverage can not guarantee the elimination of the disease for a voluntary vaccination policy. On the other hand, limited vaccination may be harmful for the control of the disease spread. The amount of up-to-date information for the vaccine use has two opposite effects: knowledge about the disease prevalence encourages parents to take the vaccine for their children, on the other hand the potential side effects discourage them to take vaccine for their children. Based on the game theory, we conclude that it is important that parents make rational decision whether or not to vaccinate their children.
